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SELECTED OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY DECISIONS
The Circuit Court ultimately agreed with the Power
Company, therefore remanding the case so the
Regulatory Commission can conform with such
findings.

Federal
United States Court of Federal Claims
System Fuels, Inc. v. United States, Nuclear Reg. Rep.
P. 20,761, No. 03-2621C, 2016 WL 537617 (Fed. Cl.
Feb. 10, 2016).

State
Colorado

Several nuclear energy companies (Plaintiffs) filed suit
against the United States alleging that the Department
of Energy (DOE) breached the Standard Contract that
each entered into with DOE outlining the disposal of
nuclear fuel. At issue was the DOE’s breach of a 1983
Standard Contract for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel
and/or high level radioactive waste, which specifically
dealt with those who generated or held title to highlevel radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel of
domestic origin. The Government was found liable for
partial breach of contract, and the only issue before the
Court of Federal Claims was the amount of damages
owed to Plaintiffs. The Court of Federal Claims made a
number of findings regarding monetary recovery and
held that Plaintiffs should recover damages for their dry
fuel storage project, including salaries of employees on
that project. The final award to Plaintiffs was in the
amount of $49,403,339.

Lindauer v. Williams Production RMT Co., 2016
COA 39 (Colo. App. 2016).
Lessors leased their mineral rights to Company
retaining a leasehold royalty interest. Company
produced gas from the mineral estate and incurred
costs for compressing, gathering, and processing the
gas. Company did not deduct any of the costs that
accrued from the gas until it reached the “tailgate” of
a processing plant, where it entered into the mainline
pipeline and reached its first commercial market
location. Prior to Company’s production of the gas, it
entered into long-term contracts with pipeline
companies so it could reserve capacity on the
mainline pipeline to transport the gas to downstream
markets where it could obtain higher sale prices of
the gas. Company subsequently deducted the costs it
incurred transporting the gas from the “tailgate” to
the downstream markets from Lessors’ royalty.
Lessors brought suit, alleging that the Company may
only be allowed to deduct those costs if it can show
that the costs are reasonable and that their “royalty
revenues increase in proportion with the costs
assessed against the royalties” on a month-by-month
basis. Company alternatively argued that the only test
that should be applied is the “prudent operator rule.”
This
rule
examines
Company’s
overall
reasonableness in entering into these long-term
contracts to determine whether the contracts benefit
both Company and Lessors more than selling the gas
at the “tailgate” or the place of first marketability.
The Colorado Appellate Court agreed with Company
and found that transportation costs incurred after the
gas reached the “tailgate” are deductible if those
costs are reasonable. Additionally, the Court found
that Company was not required to show that those
costs either increased Lessors’ royalties or enhanced
the value of the gas.

District of Columbia Circuit
Xcel Energy Servs. Inc. v. F.E.R.C., No. 14-1282, 2016
WL 874746 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 8, 2016).
Power Company appeals orders from Regulatory
Commission, which ultimately denied the Power
Company refunds from a rate schedule that it deemed
unfair. The Regulatory Commission had allowed a tariff
revision filed by the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) to
take effect without suspension or a voluntary refund
commitment, despite the Power Company raising
material issues and complaints about the tariff rate. The
rise of a material issue warranted a Section 205 Review
of the Federal Power Act regarding the tariff rate,
which was not granted. When the Power Company filed
for a rehearing, during which the Regulatory
Commission found it had erred as a matter of law, but
that it lacked any jurisdiction to retroactively refund the
rates. Regulatory Commission therefore asked the SPP
to file either a removal of the tariff or a refund of the
rates starting on February 22, 2013. Power Company
appealed the Regulatory Commission’s order stating
that as no extensive Section 205 Review was completed
prior to the implementation of the tariff, a retroactive
refund should be deemed both necessary and proper.

Rocky Mountain Expl., Inc. v. Davis Graham &
Stubbs LLP, 2016 COA 33 (Colo. App. 2016).
Mineral Sellers appealed the Colorado District
Court’s order granting Law Firm’s motion for
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summary judgment. Mineral Sellers sold oil and gas
interest to Lario Oil and Gas Company (Lario), who
served as an agent for Tracker, an unidentified principal
in the transaction. Tracker was also Law Firm’s client.
Seller alleged that Law Firm: (1) engaged in a civil
conspiracy to use agent buyer as a strawman purchaser,
(2) aided and abetted agent’s and principal’s breach of
fiduciary duty, (3) tortiously interfered with Seller’s
business expectancy, (4) aided and abetted fraud, (5)
engaged in conspiracy to commit fraud, and (6)
committed fraud. The Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decisions and held that the
(1) agent, principal, and Law Firms’ scheme to
purchase Mineral Seller’s oil and gas interest through
use of strawman did not amount to fraudulent conduct;
(2) purchase and sale agreement’s creation of an area of
mutual interest did not create a joint venture, thus no
fiduciary interest between seller, purchasing agent, and
its principal; (3) Mineral Seller’s assertion that the Law
Firms misled Mineral Seller and its joint venture
partners into believing the Law Firms were acting
solely as legal counsel to agent, stated a claim for
fraudulent nondisclosure rather than affirmative fraud;
(4) seller failed to allege that Law Firms had a duty to
disclose that it represented only undisclosed principal,
as required to state a claim for affirmative fraud, civil
conspiracy to commit fraud, and aiding and abetting
fraud; (5) seller could not have relied on law firm’s
alleged failure to disclose that it represented only agent
buyer’s principal.

exploration and production unit zoned within the
boundaries of the Parish.

Louisiana

Ward and Harrell each claimed ownership of the
mineral estate under a tract of land now owned by
Ward (Subject Tract). The chancery court reformed
the deed to quiet title to the minerals in Harrell,
reasoning that a prior deed was ambiguous. The court
of appeals affirmed, but based its ruling on mutual
mistake and scrivener’s error rather than finding
ambiguity. Harrell, Ward’s predecessor-in-interest to
the Subject Tract, had previously conveyed the
Subject Tract to Martin by warranty deed which
stated, “[t]he Grantee herein retains all mineral rights
on said land and property.” Martin conveyed the
Subject Tract to Ward by warranty deed excepting all
minerals in and under the Subject Tract “which have
been previously reserved or conveyed.” Both Ward
and Harrell subsequently granted oil and gas leases
covering the Subject Tract. The court determined that
actions taken by Harrell prior to the conveyance to
Martin, including granting three oil and gas leases
and correcting the legal description, coupled with the
lack of any indication that Martin ever attempted to
claim the mineral estate and later granted the Subject
Tract to Ward “subject to” the prior reservation,
satisfied the relevant evidentiary standard of proving

Regions Bank v. Questar Exploration & Production
Corp., 184 So.3d 260 (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir. 2016).
In what began as an action against an exploration and
production company for the failure to develop
mineral leases, mineral rights owners later amended
their petition to ask the court to declare that the leases
in question had terminated. A Louisiana statute
provided that leases that contain terms extending
beyond 99 years are invalid. The trial court, holding
the statute was inapplicable to the leases, entered
summary judgment in favor of Lessors, and the
mineral rights owners appealed. The Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that since
the judgment certification defects were cured by the
trial court and resulted in proper certification, the
Court of Appeal did indeed have jurisdiction to
review partial summary judgment. Moreover, they
also held that the leases were not perpetual in nature,
and therefore not void from the beginning as against
public policy. The action was then remanded for
further proceedings.
Mississippi
Ward v. Harrell, 2015-CA-00101-COA, 2016 WL
703099 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2016).

St. Tammany Parish Government v. Welsh, No. 2015
CA 1152, 2016 WL 918361 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2016).
In 2010, the Parish completed a rezoning process of
unincorporated areas within its boundaries. In 2014, the
Louisiana State Commissioner approved a drilling and
production permit to explore for and produce oil and
gas on land located within the Parish. The Parish filed
suit against the Commissioner alleging that such a
permit regarding the land within their rezoning area was
an unconstitutional preemption of local power. The
Appellate Court found that Louisiana state law
preempted the Parish’s zoning laws because the clear
language of state law demonstrates the legislature’s
intent to preempt any local area of law that affects the
State’s regulation of its oil and gas activity. In addition,
the Parish also argued that the Commissioner did not
consider its master plan before proceeding with activity
that affected the Parish’s plan. The Court found that the
Commissioner did address and consider the Parish’s
plans before going through with the exploration and
production process. Therefore, the Appellate Court held
that the Commissioner may proceed with the
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mutual mistake and scrivener’s error beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Court of Montana affirmed the lower court, holding
that the remedies available under the Surface Damage
Act are expressly stated—within the Act itself—as
not being exclusive and exist as an attempt to
facilitate communication to resolve damage disputes.
Since they are not to be used as an agency or
administrative proceeding that must be exhausted
before litigation may be commenced, the estate was
not required to pursue this remedy before litigating
their damage claim against the exploration company.

Montana
Wicklund v. Sundheim, 2016 MT 62 (Mont. 2016).
Grantors conveyed real property to Grantees in a 1953
Warranty Deed, which included a 3/5ths reservation in
the mineral interests and a 3/5ths reservation of any and
all delay rentals. Prior to this deed, Grantors’
predecessors conveyed an oil and gas lease on certain
portions of the land to a third party, but the lease
expired in 1958. The issue presented on appeal was
whether the reservation language in the 1953 warranty
deed terminated when the third party lease expired in
1958, thus placing all of the royalty interests in
Grantees after that date. The Supreme Court of
Montana held that the warranty deed was ambiguous
and found that the lower court erred when it did not
consider the extrinsic evidence presented by Grantors to
resolve the ambiguity. Specifically, the Court held that
because both parties signed a Communitization
Agreement almost two decades after the 1958 deed
expired, Grantees voluntary acknowledged that they
were aware of Grantors’ continuing mineral interest in
the property at issue. Thus, the Court found that
Grantees’ conduct supported Grantors’ argument that a
3/5ths royalty reservation in the 1953 warranty deed did
not terminate when the third party lease expired in
1958. Furthermore, the Court found that the lower court
erred when it held that the doctrine of laches applied,
denying Grantors’ claim to their 3/5ths royalty due to
the length of time that elapsed before Grantors brought
suit to confirm their royalty interests. Instead, the
Supreme Court found that the evidence asserted a
perpetual royalty interest each time there was new oil
and gas development on the property. Therefore, the
Court found that the Grantors were entitled to a 3/5ths
royalty interest in the property at issue as reserved in
the 1953 warranty deed.

New York
In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 62 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 78
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2016).
Debtor, an independent energy company, filed for
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. Before the United States
Bankruptcy Court was Debtor’s motion for an order
authorizing rejection of certain executory contracts
between Oil & Gas Corporation (Corporation) and
Gas Gatherer as well as between Corporation and
Holding Company. Corporation became party to two
contracts with Gas Gatherer, a gas gathering
agreement and condensate gathering agreement
(collectively, Gathering Agreements). Corporation
also became party to two contracts with Holding
Company, a production gathering, treating and
processing agreement and a water and acid gas
handling agreement (collectively, Processing
Agreements). Each of these agreements were
governed by Texas law. The Court found the Debtor
satisfied the standard, “whether a reasonable business
person would make a similar decision under similar
circumstances,” for the rejection of the agreements.
However, both Gas Gatherer and Holding Company
objected to Debtor’s proposed rejection arguing that
Corporation’s contractual covenants “run with the
land.” A covenant runs with the land when: (1) it
touches/concerns the land; (2) it relates to a thing in
existence or specifically binds the parties and their
assigns; (3) it is intended by the original parties to
run with the land; and (4) the successor to the burden
has notice. The covenants at issue did not appear to
satisfy the “touch and concern” prong since the
covenant must (a) burden the promisor’s legal
interest in the land to touch and concern that land,
and (b) it must still affect the owner’s interest in the
property or its use. Here, Debtor did not reserve any
interest for Gas Gatherer nor Holding Company,
rather they simply engaged in certain services. The
Court’s conclusion that the covenants at issue did not
run with the land is non-binding, but the Court
granted the motion finding that Debtor’s decision to
reject each of the Gathering and Processing

Interstate Explorations, LLC v. Morgen Farm and
Ranch, Inc., 2016 MT 20 (Mont. 2016).
An exploration company that had been leasing mineral
rights from a farm and ranch estate brought declaratory
action against the estate, alleging the estate was wrong
in denying the company access to essential easements
that would allow them to install a power line to operate
the well drilled on property. The estate counterclaimed
and sought monetary damages for an alleged
hydrocarbon spill. The district court denied lessee's
motion to dismiss counterclaims, which asserted that
the lessor failed to first exhaust administrative remedies
before initiating legal action for damages. The Supreme
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under the Duhig doctrine. Subsequently, the
Appellate Court rejected Mineral Owner’s judicial
estoppel claim because Perryman had no motive for
concealment during bankruptcy, and the failure to
disclose his royalty interest occurred more than 25
years prior to the present suit. In addition, the
Appellate Court concluded that Royalty Interest
Holders are not barred from claiming a one-fourth
royalty interest in the land inherited from their
father’s estate.

Agreements to be reasonable exercise of business
judgment.
North Dakota
Kittleson v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 2016 ND 44
(N.D. 2016).
Mineral Lessee appealed from a lower court decision
that interpreted a no-deductions clause, calculated
damages for breach of that clause, and applied a tenyear statute of limitations to the action to recover by
Mineral Lessor. The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court’s decision. The royalty clause
called for payment to Lessor of “the market value at the
well for all gas . . . produced from the leased
premises . . .; provided however, that there shall be no
deductions [for post-production costs].” While the “at
the well” language allows deduction of reasonable postproduction costs from the sales price received, the more
specific “no deductions language qualifies and prevails
over [the at the well clause].” The court applied a tenyear statute of limitations and awarded Lessor damages
of approximately $17,240 for improper royalty
deductions from 1997 to 2009, plus interest, attorney’s
fees, and costs. Lessor was found not to have severed
the gas from his property before it was sold and
therefore was not a “seller” under the Uniform
Commercial Code. Thus, the ten-year statute of
limitations was appropriately applied due to its
governance of instruments affecting title to real
property.

Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., LP v. Petromax
Operating Co., No. 06-15-00044-CV, 2016 WL
908228 (Tex. App. Mar. 10, 2016).
In 1975, predecessors of Purported Interest Holder
entered into an agreement by which they would
receive a 25% interest in nine existing leasehold
areas. The agreement provided that the if either
company were to acquire land within an Area of
Mutual Interest (AMI), then the same offer should be
made such that Purported Interest Holder would
receive a 25% share in the lease and the other
company a 75% share in the lease. In 1978, Purported
Interest Holder entered into a farmout agreement with
Operators’ predecessor for portions of the leases after
oil and gas were found within the land. In 1994,
Purported Interest Holder entered into an assignment
and bill of sale for its remaining interest in most of its
leases, including the one in question. In 2007, an
examination of title search performed by Operators
found that Purported Interest Holder still retained an
interest in the land. In the years between 2007 and
2012, Operators offered Purported Interest Holder an
opportunity to participate in joint ventures on the
properties, in which Purported Interest Holder did
occasionally participate. In 2012, an examination of
title determined that Purported Interest Holder did not
own any interest in lease in question, and therefore
was sent a reimbursement check for expenses it had
incurred in drilling the most recent well. Purported
Interest Holder filed suit stating that it still owned a
mineral interest underlying the property, based on the
1994 agreement. The lower court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Defendant, stating that the
1994 agreement was unambiguous and that Purported
Interest Holder had sold all its interest in the lease in
question. On appeal, the Appellate Court agreed with
the lower court’s reasoning and affirmed the
decision.

Texas
Spartan Texas Capital Partners, Ltd. v. Perryman, No.
14–14–00873–CV, 2016 WL 796073 (Tex. App. Mar.
1, 2016).
Mineral Owners brought suit against Exploration
Company, which then brought a third-party action
against purported Royalty Interest Holders. Mineral
Owners settled their disputes with Exploration
Company out of court. Mineral Owners then claimed
that Royalty Interest Holders failed to mention any
prior conveyances of a one-half royalty interest in
various deed conveyances, and thus were estopped from
claiming a one-half royalty interest in the property.
Mineral Owners further claimed that one of the Royalty
Interest Holders, Perryman, failed to disclose an
inherited interest in the subject property when he filed
for bankruptcy. The lower court ruled in favor of
Royalty Interest Holders, and Mineral Owners appealed
the decision. The Appellate Court held that the Royalty
Interest Holders conveyed their entire royalty interest
and were estopped from claiming a royalty interest

Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC v. Chaparral
Energy, L.L.C., Util. L. Rep. P 27, 334 (Tex. App.
2016).
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Alleging that an electric utility company breached a
contract regarding the extension and construction of
equipment necessary to provide electricity to two oil
wells, an independent oil and gas production company
filed suit for damages and attorney’s fees. The district
court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the
oil and gas production company. On appeal, the utility
company argued that the breach was one of implied
warranty. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by
this argument, noting that the utility company failed to
object to this issue at trial. The Court of Appeals held
that the terms of the agreement and the more
specifically worded tariff were where the breach
occurred. Further, the court held that the damages
awarded to the oil and gas production company did not
violate the tariff's limitation of liability since there can
be no interruption of services—one of the limiting
events—when there has been no working electricity
established.
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SELECTED WIND AND WATER DECISIONS
originated with the District, the Court set aside the
Commission’s decision, remanding it for rehearing.

Federal
United States Court of Federal Claims

Newhall County Water District v. Castaic Lake
Water Agency, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429 (Cal. Ct. App.
2016)

Pioneer Reserve, LLC v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl.
112 (2016).
Corporation formed for the express purpose of
preserving a wetlands habitat filed suit against the
United States, claiming the United States’ Army Corps
of Engineers breached an Umbrella Mitigation Banking
Instrument (UMBI). The instrument was intended to be
purchasable by third parties to function as credits that
would offset environmental damage committed by the
third-party. Corporation filed a motion for summary
judgment for the UMBI to be considered a legally
binding contract. Furthermore, Corporation claimed the
Army Corps unilaterally amended the number of credits
involved in the UMBI and failed to properly reimburse
Corporation for the credits. The United States also filed
a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the
credits were purely speculative in nature and no
damages were actually incurred. The United States
Court of Federal Claims determined that a contract
existed, but that questions of fact remained to determine
if Corporation consented to the amendments and
whether it suffered any damages. Because questions of
material fact remained, the Court refused to grant
summary judgment.

A county water district and purveyor (District),
brought suit for writ of mandate against a state water
agency (Agency), challenging its new rate structure
for water provided to the districts. The District
claimed that the new rates, assessed based on the
districts’ total water use rather than the volume of
water imported, violated state laws, including
California State Proposition 26, requiring such rates
to be proportionate to burdens and benefits of the
service and related to reasonable costs of providing
the service. The lower court granted the mandate, and
the Agency appealed. The California Court of
Appeals for the 2nd District affirmed the lower
court’s judgment. The Court held that the Agency’s
fees were not proportionate or reasonable because it
was
charging
for
services
(non-imported
groundwater) it did not provide, as well as
groundwater planning activities that benefitted the
region as a whole, not purely the districts affected by
increased rates.

State

Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, No.
42772, 2016 WL 768152 (Idaho Feb. 29, 2016).

Idaho

California
A Fish Hatchery Operator (Operator) contended that
Junior Water Rights Holders (Rights Holders) were
infringing on its ground water supply. Operator
sought for the Director of the Idaho Department of
Water Resources to impose limitations on the Rights
Holder’s pumping. In order to compensate for the lost
water, Operator sought to pump water outside of its
allotted ten-acre tract. However, the Director
determined that the available water to all Rights
Holders had gradually declined, and the Rights
Holders were allocating their water without waste.
On review, the Supreme Court of Idaho determined
the Operator may only pump water from its
designated tract, and the Rights Holders were
permitted to continue pumping water. The Court also
determined while the Operator asserted water rights
to an entire spring, the Director was permitted to
limit pumping from one mouth of the spring.

Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. v. Public
Utilities Com., 364 P.3d 404 (Cal. 2016).
A regional California water district (District) assessed
an extra fee on a public water utility company’s
(Company) customers to help fund an environmental
impact mitigation program. The extra fee was included
in the Company’s customer bills. The Commission, a
regulatory agency with legislative authority to regulate
rates of public utility companies, denied the Company’s
request to maintain the fee system in place, questioning
the system’s cost-effectiveness. The District requested a
writ of review from the California Supreme Court. The
Commission argued that the fees in question should be
viewed as a surcharge by the Company, rather than a
government fee, thus allowing it to regulate the fee. The
Court found that the Commission had no legislative
authority to regulate fees set by state agencies,
including the District. Because the fee ultimately
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SELECTED AGRICULTURE DECISIONS
Federal
contained constituent elements required for sustained
preservation of polar bears—was in accordance with
the statutory purpose. Additionally, the FWS
designation was not arbitrary and capricious because
the designation contained areas required protection for
both birthing and acclimation of bear cubs, and the
FWS provided explanation for its treatment of areas of
known human habitation. Lastly, the Court stated that
the plain text of the ESA indicates that consultation
with the state is discretionary, not mandatory.

7th Circuit
DJL Farm LLC, et al. v. U.S. E.P.A., Nos. 15–2245,
15–2246, 15–2247, 15–2248, 2016 WL 716185 (7th
Cir. Feb. 23, 2016)
Emission Mitigation Company (Company) applied for
and was granted four permits by the EPA to construct
and operate underground injection control wells.
Company was to inject carbon dioxide into deep
subsurface rock formations for storage designed to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions while attempting to
mitigate climate change. Farm, along with other
landowners, challenged the permits and filed petitions
for review with the EPA, which were denied by the
Board. Upon denial by the Board, this Circuit began
review. Because Company failed to obtain an
extension from the EPA, both Company and the EPA
moved to vacate oral arguments and dismiss the
petitions for review as moot. The Circuit Court held
that the issue was moot, because the permits were
expired as of February 2, 2016, due to suspension of
funding resulting from lack of progress in
construction. The Circuit Court held that because the
expired permits cannot be transferred, reissued, or
used as a basis for issuing new permits in the same
locations, both Company and the EPA have met the
burden that the allegedly wrongful behavior could be
reasonably expected to occur.

Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. U.S. E.P.A., 81 ERC 2225
(9th Cir. 2016).
The EPA implemented a Final Rule, which partially
disapproved of Arizona’s Clean Air Act regional haze
State Implementation Plan (SIP) submission and
instead led EPA to promulgate a Federal
Implementation Plan (FIP) in response. The EPA
concluded that Arizona’s best available retrofit
technology (BART) determinations were deficient in
three particular respects. First, EPA determined that
Arizona’s control cost calculations were not
performed in accordance with the Guidelines and were
otherwise unreasonable. Second, that Arizona did not
evaluate the visibility improvements to all Class I
areas in the proper fashion, as required by EPA.
Lastly,
Arizona
inadequately
explained
its
consideration of the BART factors. As a result, EPA
disapproved of Arizona’s BART determinations and
promulgated an FIP with replacement determinations
of nitrogen oxide limits. The Ninth Circuit held that
the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to EPA’s
determinations, and that EPA did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously when EPA determined Arizona’s lack of
compliance and implemented an FIP.

9th Circuit
Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n. v. Jewell, Nos. 13–35619,
13–35666, 13–35662, 13–35667, 13–35669, 2016 WL
766855 (9th Cir. 2016).

Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center. v. Gerritsma, No.
13-35811, 2016 WL 775297 (9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2016).

U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) listed polar bears
as threatened under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), and in accordance with the ESA, FWS
designated habitat critical to the conservation of polar
bears. Oil and Gas Trade Associations, several Alaska
Native Corporations, and the State of Alaska
(collectively, Interested Parties), brought suit against
the FWS, challenging the habitat designation under the
ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Interested Parties claimed that the habitat designation
was unjustifiably large, and that FWS failed to follow
ESA procedure. The lower court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Interested Parties. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision. The Circuit
Court held that the standard that FWS followed in
making the designation—looking to areas that

Wildland Centers brought suit against the United
States Bureau of Land Management and field manager
in his official capacity (collectively, BLM) under the
Administrative Procedure Act alleging that the BLM
violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act (FLPMA) in its approval of a logging project
(Project). Wildland Centers argued the BLM’s
Environmental Assessment (EA) of the project failed
to sufficiently comply with NEPA in its consideration
of the impact the Project would have on the
environment. Specifically, the Wildland Centers
argued that the EA was insufficient for two reasons.
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Landowners filed suit to quiet title for land, asserting
ownership of the disputed land by adverse possession.
The State sold the land on two separate occasions by
tax sales. The Supreme Court found that despite the
landowners satisfying the four common law
requirements for adverse possession—control, intent,
notice, and duration—the landowners had not
perfected their adverse possession claim because they
had not paid property taxes on the disputed land. Due
to Indiana Tax Deed Statutes mandating that the sale
of any property by tax deeds severs all prior claims of
ownership, including ownership by adverse
possession, the Court held that the landowners were
divested of any interest in the disputed land. Thus, the
tax sales of the disputed land defeated the landowners’
ownership claim by adverse possession.

First, the BLM failed to state the exact number and
location of all infected trees to be removed. Second,
the BLM failed to fully consider the environmental
impact that may occur due to unauthorized offhighway vehicle use facilitated by the Project’s
requirement for new roads. Additionally, Wildland
Centers argued the BLM failed to adhere to its
FLPMA required land use plan by failing to comply
with the plan’s prohibition on a decrease in soil
productivity and a requirement for the preservation of
fragile soils. These shortcomings were argued to
render the BLM’s actions arbitrary and capricious.
The lower court ruled in favor of the BLM on all
claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
decision. In determining that the EA sufficient under
NEPA, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the BLM’s
environmental impact estimate and its decision not to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement.
Similarly, the court dismissed both FLPMA claims by
giving deference to the BLM’s land use plan which,
according to the court, did contemplate some decrease
in soil productivity and carefully considered—but did
not definitively identify—the presence of fragile soil.

Montana
Montana Environmental Information Center v.
Montana Dept. of Environmental Quality, 2016 MT 9
(Mont. 2016).
State Environmental Information Center (Center) filed
suit challenging the Department of Environmental
Quality’s (DEQ) decision to approve the expansion of
a gold mine to include a smaller nearby pit. Center
argued that the DEQ’s plan to reclaim the nearby pit
violated the Montana constitution because it did not
require the expanding company to completely backfill
the pit after closure. Center also contended that the
DEQ’s decision to select the particular reclamation
plan was arbitrary and capricious because the criteria
set forth in the Montana Metal Mine Reclamation Act
(MMRA) were not satisfied. The DEQ contended that
Center was estopped from litigating its constitutional
argument since the exact issue had been litigated in a
prior proceeding, with Center obtaining an adverse
judgment. The DEQ also maintained its reclamation
plan was in compliance with MMRA requirements.
The lower court ruled in favor of the DEQ. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the lower
court’s decision. The Court held that the Center was
barred by issue preclusion from re-litigating its
constitutional claim on the grounds that, while
couched in different language, the constitutional
standard it advocated in the present case was
indistinguishable from the argumentative standard put
forth in prior litigation. Moreover, the Court found no
meaningful, legally significant difference between the
issue in the present litigation and the factually similar
issue in the previous case. Thus, the Court reaffirmed
that the Montana constitution does not require land
disturbed by the taking of natural resources to be fully
reclaimed to its previous condition and held that the
MMRA is constitutional. Additionally, the Court held

State
Alabama
Gulf Restoration Network v. Jewell, No. 15-00191CB-C, 2016 WL 617461 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 16, 2016).
A non-profit, environmental organization (Plaintiff)
filed suit against federal and state appointed Trustees
who were designated to develop a plan to restore the
natural habitat following the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiff challenged the
agencies’ plan to use a portion of funds dedicated for
early restoration of natural resources to partially fund
a lodge and conference center in Alabama’s Gulf State
Park. The District Court held that while the Trustees
failed to consider reasonable alternatives to the
proposed lease project, they did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in conducting their environmental impact
statement pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act. Further, the project did not violate the National
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) because only
direct, not indirect effects of the proposed action must
be studied. However, the court did decide to enjoin use
of early restoration funds by the Trustees pending
further NEPA review.
Indiana
Bonnell v. Cotner, No. 66503-1509-PL-530, 2016 WL
614107 (Ind. Feb. 16, 2016).
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the DEQ’s reclamation plan was not arbitrary or
capricious under the MMRA and was supported by
substantial evidence.
Utah
Q-2 L.L.C. v. Hughes, 2016 UT 8 (Utah 2016).
Landowners collectively brought a quiet title action
against Neighbor under the theory of boundary by
acquiescence. Neighbor counterclaimed for adverse
possession of the disputed land. On review, the
Supreme Court of Utah addressed: (1) how and when a
party acquires title under the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence; and (2) whether title transfers by
operation of law at the time elements of boundary by
acquiescence are met or by judicial decree at the time
the trial court enters its order. On the first issue, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified the rule that
title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
transfers by operation of law, not by judicial order. On
the second issue, the Court held that the boundary by
acquiescence doctrine grants title by operation when
its elements are met, and judicial adjudication of a
boundary dispute does not confer title but merely
determines the point at which title is vested.
Virginia
Wetlands America Trust, Inc. v. White Cloud Nine
Ventures, L.P., 782 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 2016).
Trust held a conservation easement and sought a
declaratory judgment against Property Owner for
allegedly violating the easement’s restrictive
covenants. Trust asserted that Property Owner’s
construction activities and intended commercial use of
new facilities on the property violated the conservation
easement. The trial court entered judgment in favor of
Property Owner. Trust appealed. The Supreme Court
of Virginia held that the farm construction was
permitted on the property, that the grading of site for a
parking area did not violate terms of the easement, and
that prior written approval from the Trust was not
needed. Also, because Property Owner’s construction
and use of new facilities did not significantly interfere
with easement’s conservation values or environment,
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
judgment.
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